Lebanon, this mountainous and coastal strip in the heart of the Middle East, has never been merely an ordinary or transient geographic space in the Levant. With that distinctive geography, it has always constituted a meeting point of civilizations, history, and cultures. The tourism sector stands out as one of the most prominent expressions of this civilizational standing — not only as a source of economic income, but also as evidence of the ability of the state and society to turn their resources into a tool for development.
In the summer of 2025, this role seemed on the verge of reclaiming its place; in mid-June, Beirut’s hotels recorded occupancy rates of 80% following Eid al-Adha, while Rafic Hariri International Airport received record numbers of tourists — which heralded a potential economic breakthrough and reflected partial confidence in Lebanon’s ability to confront its internal crises.
Yet these expectations quickly collided with a fragile geopolitical reality, particularly when the Israeli-Iranian war broke out and lasted 12 days, exposing the fragility of the Lebanese tourism sector in the face of security shocks, while at the same time highlighting a deeper crisis that represents the core of the Lebanese state’s predicament: the absence of the ability to impose sovereignty, and the duality of decision-making between the state and Hezbollah outside official institutions over the question of restricting weapons. This makes any economic recovery hostage to an unstable political reality, and turns the tourism challenge into an existential test of Lebanese sovereignty itself.
Revealing Indicators
Before the outbreak of the Iranian-Israeli conflict, all the data pointed to the summer of 2025 being poised to become a positive turning point for the Lebanese tourism sector, drawing on historical foundations, diplomatic breakthroughs, and promising field figures that gave hope of an economic recovery. This is clear in the following points:
1- The restoration of the tourism sector’s role as a fundamental engine of the Lebanese economy: Tourism historically constituted more than 20% of Lebanon’s gross domestic product before the 2019 crisis, according to a report by This is Beirut. In 2019, total tourism revenues reached 954.6 trillion Lebanese pounds, equivalent to about 8.3 billion US dollars, confirming the vital role the sector played in supporting the national economy and diversifying income sources at the time.
In mid-June, Beirut's hotels recorded occupancy rates of 80% following Eid al-Adha,
while Rafic Hariri International Airport received record numbers of tourists
With the onset of the economic crisis in Lebanon, the tourism sector witnessed a major decline, as revenues fell to 2.35 billion US dollars in 2020, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the worsening financial crisis. Nevertheless, revenues began to recover gradually, reaching 6.11 billion US dollars in 2023, which reflects the sector’s ability to adapt and confront economic shocks.
In 2024, the tourism sector witnessed a notable rebound, as its contribution to the gross domestic product rose to 19.8% compared to 8.4% in 2023, and it supported more than 315,000 jobs, confirming its vital role as a key economic engine and a major source of employment.
However, security challenges continued to cast their shadow over the tourism sector, as tourism was negatively affected by the armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2024, and the United Nations expected the sector’s contribution to GDP to drop to 5.5% in that year.
Added to this is that the high inflation rates during the previous years, which peaked in May 2023 at more than 260%, eased relatively in 2025 to reach about 14% in May 2025, which provides a favorable opportunity for the tourism sector to reclaim its role as a fundamental engine of the economy, by attracting tourists and raising the purchasing power of local residents, provided that political and security stability continues.
2- A diplomatic breakthrough opening the doors of Gulf tourism: After years of presidential vacuum in Beirut, the United Arab Emirates’ decision in May 2025 to lift the travel ban on its citizens to Lebanon constituted a positive step and a genuine glimmer of hope for the Lebanese tourism sector.
The United Nations expected the sector's contribution to GDP to drop to 5.5% in 2024.
The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on May 4, 2025, that the ban would be lifted as of May 7, following an official visit by Lebanese President Michel Aoun to Abu Dhabi, where he met his Emirati counterpart Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and an agreement was reached to facilitate travel movement and strengthen bilateral relations.
This decision is a fundamental indicator of the restoration of tourist movement from the Gulf states, especially tourists with high purchasing power who, in turn, form the backbone of the summer tourist season in Lebanon. It reflects the importance of strengthening economic and political cooperation between the two countries, and on the other hand pushes toward channeling Gulf investments into Lebanon in particular and the Levant in general, especially after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in late 2024.
3- Recording record occupancy rates heralding an exceptional summer: The field figures were the clearest evidence of a promising season; with hotel occupancy rates in Beirut reaching 80% immediately after Eid al-Adha, and Rafic Hariri International Airport receiving between 12,000 and 13,000 arrivals daily, all indicators confirmed that the sector was heading toward achieving figures it had not seen in years.
Catastrophic Repercussions
The Israeli-Iranian war came to turn all the positive expectations upside down, and to reveal that the fragility of the tourism sector in the face of security shocks is merely a symptom of a deeper illness: the crisis of the state’s sovereignty and its ability to take decisions of war and peace. These repercussions are as follows:
1- An immediate collapse in travel bookings and the cancellation of international flights: The twelve-day war led to an immediate and sharp drop in Lebanese tourism bookings by more than 60%, according to what was reported by Travel and Tour, citing statements by the head of the travel agencies syndicate, Jean Abboud. In a crushing blow to the sector, more than 50 airlines suspended their flights to Beirut, almost completely reducing international access.
2- Incurring direct financial losses that threaten the existence of the tourism sector: Preliminary estimates indicate that the direct losses of the tourism sector range between 300 and 500 million dollars. This figure is added to the broader losses estimated by the World Bank in March 2025, where Lebanon’s losses reached about 3.4 billion dollars in the trade, industry, and tourism sectors, placing these sectors before a real challenge to survive and resume activity.
That the fragility of the tourism sector in the face of security shocks is merely a symptom of a deeper illness,
namely the crisis of the state's sovereignty
Geographically, the governorates of Nabatieh and the South were the most affected, followed by the Mount Lebanon governorate, which includes the southern suburb of the capital, Beirut. Added to this is that the armed conflict that erupted in 2024 between Hezbollah — Iran’s most prominent proxy in the region — and Israel in southern Lebanon was one of the main causes of these losses.
Therefore, estimates indicated that the reconstruction and recovery needs after this conflict reach about 11 billion US dollars, which reflects the scale of the economic and logistical challenges facing Beirut across all sectors and regions, challenges that the June 2025 war once again exacerbated.
3- The dilemma of restricting weapons as a root cause of the collapse of international confidence: The tourism collapse is not merely a reaction to a passing war, but a direct result of a deeper structural dilemma represented by the existence of weapons outside the state’s control in the first place. Since the Taif Agreement of 1989, which stipulated the exclusivity of weapons in the hands of the state, the exception granted to Hezbollah has turned into a permanent structure that undermines the Lebanese constitution.
With the formation of a new government at the beginning of 2025 that pledged the exclusivity of weapons, the response came decisively from the party’s secretary-general, Naim Qassem, in July 2025, that “the weapons are an internal affair,” affirming a strategic decision to monopolize force outside the state’s institutions. This reality places Lebanon in a state of dual authority, where a partisan group monopolizes the decision of war and peace, making any tourism investment or international confidence hostage to a decision the government does not possess.
4- The aggravation of isolation due to international travel warnings: The strict travel warnings, foremost among them the US State Department’s warning of the “danger of armed conflict,” are not merely a routine measure, but a precise reading of the current reality in the Middle East region in general.
The international equation no longer tolerates armed groups that impose a fait accompli threatening Israel or American citizens present in Lebanon or the Gulf in general, and the pressure on Beirut today regarding restricting weapons is part of that equation; it is not only about sovereign concessions, but about necessary answers concerning the future of the Lebanese state itself within the international system.
5- The erosion of investment confidence and the entrenchment of a climate of uncertainty: The repercussions resulting from the war between Tehran and Tel Aviv exceeded the direct figures to strike investor confidence at its core. The conflict did not only deter current tourists, but froze promising investment plans such as the reopening of the “Le Gray” hotel as well as the “Four Seasons.” The local or international investor sees clearly that their investment may turn to ashes by a decision taken outside constitutional frameworks, making the “climate of uncertainty” described by the Travel and Tour World report a permanent rather than a temporary state.
Overall, the Lebanese tourism sector today stands on the edge of the abyss. The figures paint a discouraging picture of the future of a sector that was the last hope for rescuing a collapsed economy after the presidential vacuum was filled at the beginning of 2025. But the crisis goes beyond being a sector crisis, to reveal an existential predicament for the Lebanese state itself; the continued existence of Hezbollah’s weapons can no longer be read except as a direct threat to the state’s sovereignty internally and its security externally, especially in light of the accelerating regional and international transformations, and particularly after the events of October 7, 2023.
