Syria is currently living through a historic turning point. Thirteen years after Bashar al-Assad’s regime violently suppressed its people, massive public rejection culminated in the fall of Assad on December 8, 2024. This moment places the Syrian people in general—and the Kurds in particular—before a very delicate stage during the transitional period, raising serious concerns and questions among Kurds about their participation in the political process of building the new Syria, given that they are an integral component of the Syrian fabric.
The Kurds had long been subjected to repressive and exclusionary policies under the former Syrian regime, right up to the final moments of its fall. Harsh living conditions and exclusion from civil, political, and cultural life created a deep rift between them and the Syrian state, which had worked hard to weaken Kurdish aspirations—particularly their identity and language. After the Syrian uprising in 2011, however, the Kurds—often accused by Damascus of separatism—emerged as a strong presence in their regions (Hasakah, Qamishli, Kobani, and Afrin).
The Kurds had long been subjected to repressive and exclusionary practices by the former Syrian regime, right up to the final moments of its fall.
Under self-administration, their goal was not secession from Syria but rather the preservation of national unity across the country’s full geography, in opposition to division. Yet with the collapse of the Assad regime, the Kurds now fear being excluded from participation in the new political process and denied constitutional recognition, thereby losing hard-earned rights and gains—despite their willingness to engage openly with the new authorities in Damascus, however uncertain the situation remains.
The Transitional Phase in Damascus
Dr. Zaidoun Al-Zoabi, a researcher in identity and governance during transitional phases, explained:
“We will likely have several transitional phases, not just one. The first will be the hardest, focused on establishing security for about three months. I expect this stage will not involve political representation, but could see partial agreements to stabilize the country and ensure safety. The next phase will depend largely on how social groups—without exclusion—can agree among themselves, and possibly with the new authorities in Damascus.”
Challenges of Including the Kurds in the Transitional Phase
Regarding the challenges facing the Kurds in this transitional period, Al-Zoabi said:
“One of the biggest challenges is getting their demands to the decision-making table in Damascus and negotiating for real Kurdish representation in the new Syrian government. Another key issue is safe reintegration into the state structure, since they are currently outside of it. I believe there is an opportunity for them to participate in upcoming dialogue processes.”
Steer Qasim, head of the administrative board of the Women Peace Leaders Network in northeast Syria, spoke about a possible Turkish scenario toward the Kurds, particularly along the border:
“All possibilities are open for Turkey to intervene in Syrian affairs now, just as it did in 2016 when it changed the balance by occupying several areas—starting from Azaz, then al-Bab, Afrin, Tal Abyad, and Ras al-Ain—under the pretext of creating a ‘safe zone.’ But Turkey’s main goal has always been to target the Kurds and dismantle the self-administration project currently in place.”
According to Qasim, this means Turkey will likely continue its approach and threats toward the region. Evidence of this, she said, was Turkey’s attack on displaced people from Afrin and Shahba on the very day Syria was liberated after Assad’s fall, expelling them from displacement camps and causing a major new wave of displacement toward northern and eastern Syria.
“All possibilities are open for Turkey to intervene in Syrian affairs now—just as it did in 2016,” she warned.
Steer added:
“Turkey has not changed its policy toward the Kurds and will try by all means to cooperate with any new Syrian political entity and the current authority in Damascus to prevent them from engaging with the Kurds and to eliminate their presence—despite the fact that they are a people with a cause who deserve full legitimate rights.”
She noted that perhaps the greatest challenge the Kurds will face during the transitional phase is the deep fragmentation within the Kurdish political movement and its divisions. Steer attributed this to political alignments and ties to parties with their own agendas, despite serious attempts by some international actors to advance the Kurdish–Kurdish dialogue process that began in 2021. This process was halted due to the unwillingness of certain parties to move it forward and the lack of proper conditions from the other side. She praised the widespread public will to complete the unification process, describing it as:
“Not organized pressure mechanisms, but rather calls and appeals driven by an emotional connection to the Kurdish people, aimed at completing Kurdish unity so it becomes a strong card in negotiations and in establishing good relations with the authorities in Damascus.”
Steer also stressed the active role of women:
“As Kurdish women, it is our duty to be part of the pressure groups working toward the shared goal of shielding the region from disasters and preserving the foundations of civil peace that exist here—foundations that have largely stayed away from the conflicts raging across Syrian territory.”
She expressed hope for a unified Kurdish stance, despite the discouraging political scene, in the belief that the Kurds could serve as a safety valve for the wide spectrum of communities in northern and eastern Syria in particular.
Kurdish Demands in Post-Assad Syria
Nawaf Khalil, Director of the Kurdish Center for Studies, said:
“The Kurds’ demands were clear both before and after Assad’s fall: constitutional recognition of their existence, and that the new Syria be a decentralized democracy. Without that, the authorities in Damascus will attempt to repeat the previous experience entirely—only this time in an Islamist form.”
Khalil added:
“If there is constitutional recognition of the Kurds and their demands are accepted, then the Kurds will be part of Syria as a whole—represented in the new government, in parliament, and in all state institutions—unlike before.”
According to Khalil, anything short of this would mean continued non-recognition of the Kurds, with no representation in the government, parliament, sovereign institutions, or the Ministry of Defense—resulting in the complete absence of Kurdish diplomats in the state’s political and military structures.
He went on:
“There are now popular calls for forming a joint Kurdish delegation to present Kurdish demands to the authorities in Damascus, which could be helpful. But the main issue lies in constitutional recognition by the new rulers in Damascus. The core question is whether they will accept a democratic Syria made up of multiple nationalities, ethnicities, and sects. If they do not present their vision in this direction, the Kurds will have no place in it.”
Turkish Attacks on the Kurds
Since 2016, Turkey has carried out multiple military operations in northern and eastern Syria under the pretext of combating terrorism—targeting Kurdish fighters in the region, whom it considers an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), labeled a terrorist organization by Ankara. The stated aim has been to secure the border strip between Turkey and Syria. However, Turkey went further, launching a large-scale offensive in 2018 that led to the occupation of the Kurdish region of Afrin, followed by the capture of Ras al-Ain (Serê Kaniyê) and Tal Abyad (Girê Spî) in 2019. These actions resulted in the displacement of the original Kurdish population from their lands, the complete seizure of their property, and the resettlement of people from other parts of Syria—part of an effort to change the region’s demographic makeup entirely.
Turkey intensified its attacks on northern and eastern Syria in 2023, continuing into the present, in pursuit of military and political gains and as a means of exporting its internal crises beyond its borders. These assaults have targeted vital infrastructure—including gas, water, and oil facilities; power stations; grain storage sites; roads; dams; hospitals; and residential buildings—posing a severe threat and pushing Kurds to flee their areas out of fear of further strikes.
Is There a Basis for Accepting the Kurds in the New Syrian Government?
Nawaf Khalil noted:
“The Kurds have done a great deal over the past years and played a major role in defeating one of the most brutal terrorist organizations in March 2019 in northern and eastern Syria. This victory led to alliances with the United States and some Western countries, as well as external relations that brought them to the U.S. Congress, the Élysée Palace, and meetings with world leaders. International media covered their significant role in fighting terrorism, along with their openness to pluralism in governance, languages, and institutions—and especially the prominence of women in all sectors. They have also worked diligently with Syrian opposition forces. This forms a solid foundation for their acceptance and constitutional recognition in Syria, and I believe the time has come to secure their legitimate rights.”
Turkey intensified its attacks on northern and eastern Syria throughout 2023, continuing to the present, seeking military and political gains and attempting to export its internal crises beyond its borders.
Khalil added that the Kurds remain in contact with Arab states, regional powers, and the international community to gain constitutional recognition of their existence. He believes this could help create a balance between the new rulers of Syria—composed of various Islamist, Salafist, and jihadist groups—and the Autonomous Administration with all its components, whether in northeastern Syria or across the country.
