With the ceasefire between Israel and Iran coming into effect on Tuesday, June 24, 2025, after 12 days of unprecedented military confrontations between the two countries, a bloody chapter of escalation was closed. However, the Israeli nuclear issue resurfaced strongly, and the Dimona reactor took center stage, raising questions and concerns amid severe Israeli secrecy and Lebanese fears of potential scenarios if conflicts were to reignite in the future.
Dimona Reactor: The “Potential” Target in Any Upcoming Escalation
During the war, Iranian officials sent clear messages, the most prominent of which was a statement on June 21, 2025, reported by “Al Arabiya,” in which an Iranian official stated that “Dimona Reactor could be a legitimate target if the war escalates to new dimensions.” This statement revived fears of a potential nuclear escalation in the region.
Although the war has ended, scenarios of a return to confrontations and escalation remain possible, especially since the occupying state frequently violates its agreements and breaches any treaties.
Although the war has ended, scenarios of a return to confrontations and escalation remain possible, especially since the occupying state frequently violates its agreements and breaches any treaties. This raises the crucial question: Does Dimona pose a real threat to Lebanon?
Israeli Secrecy Surrounding the Dimona Reactor
Information about the Dimona reactor is shrouded in complete secrecy, even within Israel. However, reports from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) have confirmed that Israel possesses approximately 80 nuclear weapons. Among these weapons are around 30 gravity bombs delivered by aircraft. The remaining 50 weapons are delivered by “Jericho 2” medium-range ballistic missiles, which are believed to be stationed with their mobile launch platforms inside caves at a military base located east of Jerusalem.
Dr. Bilal Nsouli, the head of the Lebanese Atomic Energy Commission, explains to the “Silat Wassel” that there is great secrecy from the Israeli side regarding the Dimona reactor, especially since Israel is not subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and does not receive inspection missions.
He adds that the currently available information about the reactor relies on old analyses and leaks from Western politicians who helped Israel develop its nuclear program. These data indicate the type of reactor, the nature and quantity of nuclear fuel used, as well as some details related to its affiliated facilities.
Lebanon possesses a strong early warning infrastructure in case of a nuclear threat.
Dr. Nasouli confirms that Lebanon has 20 early radiation monitoring stations, spread in cooperation with the Lebanese Army inside military barracks covering the entire Lebanese territory. These stations continuously monitor the air around the clock to detect any changes beyond the natural radiation background.
He points out that the Lebanese Atomic Energy Commission monitors any exceedance of natural radiation levels and immediately notifies the relevant authorities to guide and instruct citizens. This is part of a national response system relying on specialized institutions and a clear plan.
Lebanon is prepared for the Dimona scenario with a radiation emergency plan since 2011, involving all relevant agencies.
Nasouli reports that Lebanon established a radiation emergency plan back in 2011, simulating a potential explosion at the Dimona reactor. Training has been conducted in cooperation with first responder agencies, including the Army, Internal Security Forces, Civil Defense, Red Cross, Beirut Fire Brigade, and the Lebanese Atomic Energy Commission, as well as three key ministries: Health, Environment, and Agriculture. He explained that “each entity clearly knows its role and responsibilities within the joint coordination plan.”
What if the worst-case scenario occurs?
In the event of a radioactive leak from the Dimona reactor, according to the worst-case scenario, Nussouli explains that the distance between the Dimona reactor and the nearest Lebanese border point with the occupied Palestinian territories is about 275 km, extending up to 450 km in northern Lebanon. Based on this distance, the impact on Lebanon would be moderated—meaning reduced and indirect—especially since the radioactive cloud disperses and its concentration weakens due to distance, wind, and weather conditions.
Lebanon has 20 early radiation monitoring stations, deployed in cooperation with the Lebanese Army inside military barracks covering the entire Lebanese territory.
Nussouli adds: “The Lebanese authority maintains constant communication with the Arab Early Warning Network affiliated with the Arab League, with information and alerts exchanged almost daily. The authority also has direct relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under cooperation agreements for early notification and assistance in case of nuclear incidents or radiation disasters.”
Radiation Impact Map: 4 Potential Zones
The impact areas are divided into the following zones:
– Red Zone (0–10 km): Extremely high risk, requiring immediate evacuation.
– Orange Zone (10–50 km): Zone of mandatory evacuations and intensive emergency measures.
– Moderated Zone (50–100 km): Precautionary measures that may include temporary evacuation.
– Beyond 200 km: The impact becomes very weak and does not warrant excessive concern.
He concludes by saying:
“Much of what has been said recently about the Dimona reactor is exaggerated and comes from non-experts whose statements are not based on any scientific or technical facts. Therefore, information should only be taken from official and reliable sources.”
Although the war has ended, the fragility of the agreements and the history of violations, especially by Israel, make a return to escalation possible at any moment. Amid Israeli secrecy and regional fears, the nuclear file remains one of the most dangerous cards in the regional conflict.
Hence, the importance of preparedness and community awareness, as recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), to ensure civilian safety in case of any nuclear emergency.
Much of what has been said recently about the Dimona reactor is exaggerated and issued by non-specialists whose statements do not rely on any scientific or technical facts.
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP):
The ICRP recommends following a clear and time-sequenced plan to protect individuals in the event of a radioactive leak, as follows:
The first ten minutes:
It is advised to immediately seek shelter in a safe place inside a concrete building or in a basement.
It is preferable to take shelter in multi-story buildings with cement or brick walls.
Underground parking lots and metro stations are considered good places for shelter.
The more materials between you and the outside environment (such as walls and floors), the greater the protection from radiation.
First 24 hours:
If you suspect radiation exposure, you should:
Remove contaminated clothing and shoes.
Clean skin and hair with water and soap, or wipe thoroughly with wet towels.
Clean pets in a separate room from the shelter area, and wash them if possible.
Food, drinks, and medicine available inside stores or shelters are considered safe for consumption.
Listen to instructions through the media.
Stay inside the shelter for the first 12 to 24 hours, unless there is an immediate threat (such as fire, gas leak, or building collapse).
Self-evacuation or going outside is not advised unless authorities announce safe routes.
After 48 hours:
Continue to be cautious as radiation levels start to decrease, but they may still be dangerous in some areas.
Keep following the media for updated instructions.
Minimize the time spent outside the shelter as much as possible if you must go out, and wear a mask or cloth covering over your nose and mouth.
It is preferable to wear an additional layer of clothing or plastic over your clothes, remove it upon returning, and thoroughly clean your skin.
Pregnant women and children should stay in the safest areas inside the shelter (such as the middle of the building or the basement).
Continue consuming stored food and water cautiously, and wipe the outside of containers before use.
It is not recommended to consume local agricultural products like fruits and vegetables without inspection.
If bottled water is unavailable, tap water can be used for drinking or washing.
